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Abstract. Modern machine Learning is devoted to the construction
of algorithms and computational procedures that can automatically
improve with experience and learn from data. Defeasible argumentation
has emerged as sub-topic of artiﬁcial intelligence aimed at formalising
common-sense qualitative reasoning. The former is an inductive approach
for inference while the latter is deductive, each one having advantages
and limitations. A great challenge for theoretical and applied research in
AI is their integration. The ﬁrst aim of this chapter is to provide readers
informally with the basic notions of defeasible and non-monotonic reasoning. It then describes argumentation theory, a paradigm for implementing
defeasible reasoning in practice as well as the common multi-layer schema
upon which argument-based systems are usually built. The second aim
is to describe a selection of argument-based applications in the medical
and health-care sectors, informed by the multi-layer schema. A summary
of the features that emerge from the applications under review is aimed
at showing why defeasible argumentation is attractive for knowledgerepresentation, conﬂict resolution and inference under uncertainty. Open
problems and challenges in the ﬁeld of argumentation are subsequently
described followed by a future outlook in which three points of integration with machine learning are proposed.
Keywords: Defeasible reasoning · Argumentation · Conﬂict resolution ·
Knowledge-representation · Interactive machine learning · Medicine
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Introduction

The fast-growing ﬁeld of Machine Learning (ML) is devoted to the construction
of algorithms and computational procedures that can automatically improve
with experience and learn from data. Although ML is increasing in popularity
with a plethora of applications in several ﬁelds, and it has proved to be useful
in the identiﬁcation and extraction of meaningful patterns of data and rules,
c Springer International Publishing AG 2016
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it is often based upon algorithms that implement quantitative manipulation
of training data. These algorithms are frequently used as ‘black-boxes’ and the
inference process that lead to the quantitative output is neglected. In the last two
decades, Defeasible Reasoning (DR) has emerged as sub-topic of artiﬁcial intelligence (AI) aimed at formalising common-sense qualitative reasoning. This type
of reasoning is often performed in contexts characterised by high uncertainty,
such as medicine and health care, where available information is usually fragmented, partial, conﬂicting, noisy and multi-dimensional. Defeasible reasoning
can be combined to machine learning inference techniques and a great challenge
for theoretical and applied research in AI is their integration. This challenge
is highly connected to the notion of interactive Machine Learning (iML) [1,2]
being proposed in this book. In particular, as Fig. 1 depicts, on one hand machine
learning might support defeasible reasoning by providing it with quantitative evidence for enhancing reasoning processes. On the other hand, defeasible reasoning might contribute to extend and enhance the inferential mechanisms behind
machine learning techniques with more qualitative and transparent reasoning
and by incorporating intelligence and argumentative capacity. The integration
of these two subﬁelds of AI is likely to impact and contribute to design and
develop intelligence agents with greater knowledge extraction, predictive power
as well as argumentative and reasoning capabilities [3]. Machine learning is a
more mature branch of research within artiﬁcial intelligence than formal defeasible reasoning. Therefore the main focus of this chapter is on the latter paradigm
with emphasis on argumentation theory and argument-based systems, the computational approaches to implement defeasible reasoning in practice. The rest of
this document is organised as it follows. Firstly, a glossary describes the core definitions and terms of this desk research. Argumentation theory is subsequently
introduced with an emphasis on its role in defeasible reasoning. This is complemented by a detailed description of the multi-layered pattern upon which
argument-based systems are usually built. An overview of practical applications
of argumentation in clinical domains is then presented followed by a description
of the main features and advantages of defeasible reasoning and argumentation
theory in decision-making and knowledge representation. Open problems and
challenges in applied research are then discussed and a summary concludes this
chapter with a future outlook for argumentation and its integration with machine
learning.
supports

Machine learning

Defeasible reasoning

extends

Fig. 1. Interaction of argumentation and machine learning
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Glossary and Key Terms

Machine learning (ML): subﬁeld of computer science devoted to the design of
computational procedures able to learn from and perform prediction of data.
Default knowledge: kn owledge routinely employed by humans in a reasoning
process even if the preconditions for its application are only partially known.
Defaults: speciﬁc inference rules employed in default knowledge.
Monotonicity: property of a reasoning process in which conclusions are not
aﬀected by new pieces of evidence and, as a consequence, the set of available
conclusions monotonically increases.
Non-monotonicity: property of a reasoning process in which conclusions can be
retracted in the light of new pieces of evidence, and as a consequence, the set of
available conclusions can decrease in cardinality.
Defeasible reasoning(DR): a type of reasoning with the non-monotonicity property based upon reasons that are defeasible. This reasoning does not produce a
complete and ﬁnal demonstration of a claim, instead it acknowledges corrigibility
and fallibility of a conclusion.
Argumentation theory (AT): a multidisciplinary area of artiﬁcial intelligence that
provides state-of-the-art computational models of defeasible reasoning.
Argument: piece of evidence considered in a defeasible reasoning process. Typically an argument is built upon a set of assumptions or premises, a method of
reasoning and a conclusion.
Undermining attack: a type of conﬂict in which an argument is attacked on one
of its premises by another argument whose conclusion negates that premise.
Rebutting attack: a type of conﬂict that occurs when an argument negates the
conclusions of another argument.
Undercutting attack: a type of conﬂict that occurs when an argument uses a
defeasible inference rule that is attacked by another argument arguing that there
is a special case that does not allow the application of the rule itself.
Semantics: a formal criterion to determine which arguments of an argumentation
graph can be accepted.

3
3.1

State-of-the-Art: Defeasible Argumentation Theory
Defeasible Reasoning

The capability of deriving defeasible conclusions with partial information is an
important aspect of modern medical systems. In order to achieve such a capability, humans routinely resort to the so-called default knowledge, a main feature of
which is that it can be used in a reasoning process even if the preconditions for
its application are only partially known. These preconditions, whose truth is not
explicitly veriﬁed, are assumed to hold defeasibly, that means in the absence of
explicit information to the contrary. In the event that new information becomes
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available and the falsity of such preconditions can be deduced, then the conclusions derived from the application of the default knowledge have to be retracted.
This type of reasoning is known as defeasible reasoning [4]. Default knowledge is
represented by using defaults that are speciﬁc inference rules. These are expressions of the form: p(x) : j1 (x), ..., jn (x) −→ c(x) where p(x) is the prerequisite of
the default, j(x) is the justiﬁcation and c(x) is the consequent. If p(x) is known
and if j(x) is consistent with what is known, then c(x) can be defeasibly deduced.
In other words, if it is believed that the prerequisite is true, and each of the n
conditions (justiﬁcations) can be assumed since they are consistent with current
beliefs, then this leads to believe the truth of the conclusion. Defeasible reasoning, unlike standard deductive reasoning, is non-monotonic. Intuitively this
means that adding new premises may lead to removing, rather than adding new
conclusions. More speciﬁcally, if the conclusion p follows from a set of premises A
(denoted as A  p), in standard monotonic reasoning it also holds that A, B  p
namely t, if and only if any additional set of premises B is added to A, the conclusion p is still valid. This property is called monotonicity: conclusions are not
aﬀected by new evidence hence the set of conclusions monotonically increases.
This is not the case in real life in general and in medicine, health care in particular where reasoning is often non-monotonic: conclusions can be retracted when
new evidence is available. Consider the following example [5]:
– X has undergone breast cancer surgery and subsequently radiotherapy.
– Radiotherapy minimises the risk of cancer recurrence, so possibly
– X has a low risk of breast cancer recurrence.
If in addition to the fact that X has undergone cancer surgery and subsequently
radiotherapy, it is found out that
– X had a cancer with high degree of lymph node involvement,
then the conclusion that X has a low risk of cancer recurrence has to be retracted,
as a special exception has been raised.
Non-monotonic logic relies on the idea that the pieces of knowledge employed
in a reasoning activity such as X has a low risk of cancer recurrence may admit
exceptions and it is impossible to include a full list of exceptions within the
reasoning rules [4]. In these cases, the premise of a certain rule is only partially
speciﬁed and a conclusion can be derived from the premises, assuming that
no exception occurs, that means that all the implicit premises of the rule are
satisﬁed. In the case where an exception subsequently arises then the derived
conclusion has to be retracted. The basic idea of non-monotonic inferences is
that, when more information is obtained, some previously accepted inference
may no longer hold. Defeasible reasoning has increasingly gained attention in
the medical sector because it supports reasoning over partial, incomplete and
dynamic evidence and knowledge, where several exceptions can arise according
to various circumstances. Argumentation theory (AT), an important sub-ﬁeld
of artiﬁcial intelligence (AI), provides state-of-the-art computational models of
defeasible reasoning (DR).
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Argumentation Theory

Argumentation theory (AT), often referred to as argumentation, is a multidisciplinary research subject ranging from law to philosophy and linguistic, with
aspects borrowed from psychology and sociology [6,7]. AT has gained interest in
artiﬁcial intelligence as it provides the basis for computational models inspired
by the way humans reason [8]. These models have extended classical reasoning
approaches, based on deductive logic, that were proving increasingly inadequate
for problems requiring non-monotonic reasoning and explanatory reasoning not
available in standard non-monotonic logics [9]. AT focuses on how pieces of
evidence, seen as arguments, can be represented, supported or discarded in a
defeasible reasoning process, and it investigates formal approaches to assess the
validity of the conclusions inferred [6]. AT has been employed for tasks like
practical reasoning, decision support, dialogue and negotiation [6,10–12] as well
as for knowledge representation [13,14]. It diﬀers from many traditional monolithic non-monotonic logics because it envisages a modular and intuitive process,
supporting the explanation of each reasoning step, making the reasoning and
inference processes more explanatory.
In a nutshell, argumentation deals with the interactions between possibly conﬂicting arguments, arising when diﬀerent parties, participants or artiﬁcial agents
argue for and against some conclusions or when diﬀerent pieces of evidence, even
conﬂicting, are available [12]. Arguments can be regarded as ‘tentative proofs for
propositions’ [15] in a logical language whose axioms represent premises in the
domain under consideration. In general, the premises are not consistent because
they may lead to incompatible conclusions. These conﬂicts may arise either during the defeasible reasoning activity of a single human/agent or in the context
of a dialogue between multiple humans or artiﬁcial agents. These modes are
referred to as monological and dialogical argumentation, respectively. Accordingly, monological models [16] focus on the internal structure of an argument,
meaning its components (like premises, rules, conclusions) and their relations.
Dialogical models focus instead on argument conﬂicts and their resolution and
typically regard arguments as monolithic entities, whose internal structure is
abstracted away as far as the conﬂict resolution process is concerned. Roughly
speaking, monological models concern the production and construction of arguments while dialogical models concern management of their conﬂicts, that means
the actual arguing process. A third classiﬁcation of models, referred to as rhetorical models, has also been proposed (Table 1) in which neither the monological
nor the dialogical structure is considered [16]. Here, the rhetorical nature of
arguments is stressed. More speciﬁcally, the audience’s perception of arguments
and how they can be employed as a means of persuasion is taken into account
[17,18].
In the literature of argumentation, models belonging to one category difﬁcultly belong to the other categories. For instance, dialogical models do not
address the internal representation of an argument and do not consider their
perception by an audience. However, according to [16], in order to design intelligent systems that incorporate powerful argumentative capabilities, the micro-
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Table 1. Classiﬁcation of argumentation models

Structure

Monological

Dialogical

Rhetorical

Micro

Macro

Persuasive

Foundation Arguments as tentative
proofs

Defeasible reasoning

Audience’s perception
of arguments

Linkage

Connecting a set of
arguments in a
dialogical structure

Connecting arguments
in a persuasive way

Connecting a set of
premises to a claim at
the level of argument

structure of an argument, its relation with other arguments as well as the rhetorical structure should be addressed. The internal representation of an argument
should clearly relate premises to conclusions, and at an external level, the argument should be considered within the set of the other arguments it interacts
with. Eventually, the perception by an audience is important because in real life
implementations, arguments are built to achieve predeﬁned objectives, according to the participating agents’ believes. The general idea is that argumentation
systems formalise non-monotonic reasoning as the internal construction of arguments (micro-structure) as well as their comparisons for and against certain
conclusions (macro-structure). The construction of arguments, based on a theory, is monotonic that means an argument remains the same even if the theory is
expanded with new information. Non-monotonicity is expressed in terms of interaction between conﬂicting arguments. This is because the additional information
may generate stronger arguments that in turn defeat previous arguments.
Argumentation systems and the notion of an argument are typically constructed upon an underlying logical language and around an associated notion
of logical consequence. As mentioned before, this notion of consequence is
monotonic. New information can not invalidate existing arguments as constructed, but can only be responsible for the generation of new counterarguments. Some argument-based applications assume a particular and well-deﬁned
logic whereas other leave the underlying logic part of the context of application
or even totally undeﬁned. In the case the logic is left unspeciﬁed, the system
can be instantiated with diﬀerent alternative logics, thus they are often referred
to as frameworks rather then systems. Beside the chosen underlying language,
argumentation systems are generally built upon ﬁve layers [19] (Fig. 2):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

deﬁnition of the internal structure of arguments
deﬁnition of conﬂicts between arguments
evaluation of conﬂicts and deﬁnition of valid attacks
deﬁnition of the dialectical status of arguments
accrual of acceptable arguments

Argumentation for KR, Conﬂict Resolution and Defeasible Inference

1) structure of arguments

2) conﬂicts of arguments
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Translation of
knowledge-base
into interactive
defeasible arguments

3) evaluation of conﬂicts
Elicitation of
knowledge-base &
resolution of
inconsistencies

4) dialectical
status of arguments

Final inference

5) accrual of
acceptable arguments

Fig. 2. Five layers upon which argumentation systems are generally built

3.3

Layer 1: Definition of the Internal Structure of Arguments

The internal representation of arguments is addressed by monological models. Often an argument is internally represented with a set of premises
(P1 , P2 , ..., Pn ), and a conclusion (C) follows from them with the application
of some rule (→).
Argument : P1 , P2 , ..., Pn → C
Many argumentation systems do not make any distinction between premises.
However, arguments actually used in human reasoning may follow a more articulated structure where diﬀerent premises play diﬀerent roles, as in the argument
model ﬁrst introduced by Toulmin [20] composed of six parts (Fig. 3).
– Claim (C): an assertion/claim (conclusion) potentially controversial;
– Data (D): statements specifying facts/beliefs previously established related
to a situation in which the claim is made;
– Warrant (W): statement that justiﬁes the derivation of conclusion from data;
– Backing (B): a set of information that ensures the trustworthiness of a warrant. It is the grounds underlying the reason. A backing is invoked when the
warrant is challenged;
– Qualiﬁer (Q): a statement that expresses the degree of certainty associated
with the claim;
– Rebuttal (R): a statement introducing a situation in which the conclusion
might be defeated.
Toulmin’s model plays a signiﬁcant role in highlighting the elements that
form a natural argument, providing a useful basis for knowledge representation. Another well-known monological paradigm has been proposed by Reed and
Walton to model the notion of arguments as product [21,22]. It is based upon

190

L. Longo

Fact (D)

So (probably) (Q)

Conclusion (C)

since
Warrant (W)
because
Backing (B)

unless
Rebuttal (R)

Fig. 3. An illustration of the Toulmin’s argument representation

the notion of an argumentation scheme and it is useful for identifying and evaluating a variety of argumentation structures in everyday discourse [16]. These
argumentation schemes are aimed at capturing common stereotypical patterns
of reasoning that are non-monotonic and defeasible in nature [13]. Consider the
example presented in [8] in which two parts, A and B, are discussing chemotherapy, and that B is not in favour of it because P thinks that it has a high emotional impact on the person due to the risk of alopecia phenomenon and should
be discouraged. B’s argument is:
Argument: Dr. B (expert in psychology) says that chemotherapy aﬀects the
emotional state of the patient
It appears that B’s argument is implicitly an appeal to expert opinion. In
addition, it is evidently an instance of argument from consequences. These two
schemes can be used by B to build a point of view. B is claiming that negatively
aﬀecting the emotional state is a bad consequence of an action. The argument
is based upon the assumption that, since the bad outcome is a consequence
of chemotherapy, therefore chemotherapy should not be applied. This can be
represented by the following argumentation chain:
– Dr. B., an expert psychologist, says that chemotherapy negatively aﬀects emotional state, because he has knowledge of patients emotions;
– chemotherapy negatively aﬀects emotional state;
– negatively aﬀecting the emotional state is a bad thing;
– anything that leads to bad consequences is a bad practice;
– chemotherapy is a bad practice.
Walton identiﬁed 25 diﬀerent argumentation schemes, each including a set
of critical questions such as:
‘is the expert E in a position to know about the proposition P ?’
Critical questions provide a sort of checklist about the validity conditions for the
application of a speciﬁc argument scheme. Intuitively, critical questions make the
defeasibility of argument schemes explicit and indicate some canonical ways to
build the relevant counterarguments. For further information on monological
approaches to argumentation, readers can refer to [16]. The Toulmin’s model
[20] as well as the Reed and Walton’s approach [21,22] do not specify the way
diﬀerent argument structures can be aggregated nor how they can interact or
conﬂict in the dynamics of an argumentation process.
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Layer 2: Definition of the Conflicts Between Arguments

Monological models, aimed at representing the internal structure of arguments
are complemented by dialogical models, focused on the relationships between
arguments and, in particular, their conﬂicts. The latter investigates the issue of
invalid arguments that appear to be valid (fallacious arguments). Conﬂicts, often
referred to attacks or defeats, and sometimes with slightly diﬀerent meanings,
are the key notions in argumentation theory. In the AT literature several kinds of
conﬂicts have been considered. Here the classiﬁcation proposed in [23] is stressed.
This encompasses three classes of conﬂicts (Figs. 4, 5, and 6):
– undermining attack : occurs when an argument is attacked on one of its
premises by another whose conclusion negates that premise;
– rebutting attack occurs when an argument negates the conclusions of another;
– undercutting attack occurs when an argument uses a defeasible inference rule
and is attacked by arguing that there is a special case that does not allow the
application of the rule itself [24].

Ca

P1a

P2a

Cb

Pna

¬

A: ‘alcohol consumption is low according
to X so X has a low risk of recurrence’

P1b

P2b

Pnb

B: the alcohol level from a blood test is
high so X has a high alcohol consumption

Fig. 4. Undermining attack: A is undermined by B

3.5

Layer 3: Evaluation of Conflicts and Definition of Valid Attacks

Conﬂict between arguments, although an important notion, does not embody any
approach for the determination of the success of an attack, from one argument
to its target. Generally an attack, sometimes referred to as ‘defeat’, has a form
of a binary relation between two arguments. Some authors distinguish a relation
in a weak form (attacking another argument and not weaker) or in a strong
form (attacking another argument and stronger) [25]. The former is generally
referred to as ‘defeat’ whereas the latter as ‘strict defeat’ [23]. Defeat relations
are determined in various ways, inﬂuenced by the domain of application and
are usually defeasible. For example, in those domains where observations are
important, defeats might depend on the reliability of tests or the expertise of
the observers. Evaluating an attack can occur through:
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¬
Ca

P1a

P2a

Cb

¬

Pna

A: ‘ radiotherapy minimises risk so X has
a low risk of breast cancer recurrence

P1b

P2b

Pnb

B: ‘X is an old patient, the strongest risk
for breast cancer is age, so the risk of
recurrence is high’.

Fig. 5. Rebutting attack: A is rebutted by B and viceversa
Ca

P1a

P2a

Cb

¬

Pna

A: ‘radiotherapy minimises the risk of
recurrence so X has a low risk of breast
cancer recurrence’

P1b

P2b

Pnb

B: ‘paper Z demonstrated that
radiotherapy failed several times in
curing breast cancer so it is not always
an eﬀective method to reduce recurrence’.

Fig. 6. Undercutting attack: A is undercut by B

– the notion of preferentiality of arguments or strength of arguments
– the notion of preferentiality of attacks or strength of an attack relation.
Strength of Arguments. To establish whether an attack can be considered a
successful defeat, a trend in AT is devoted to the consideration of the strength of
arguments. In this respect a key concept is represented by the inequality of the
strength of arguments that has to be accounted for in the computation of sets
of arguments and counterarguments [26]. Several works have adopted the notion
of preferentiality among arguments [27]. For example, in [28,29], the authors
formalised the role of preferences and if an arguments X undercuts another
argument Y , then X is a successful attack (defeat) if Y is not stronger than X.
Other approaches adopt preferentiality at a more abstract level. For instance,
in the Preference-based Argumentation Framework (PAF) proposed by [30], an
attack from X to Y is successful only if Y is not preferred to X. [31] proposed
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a Value-based argumentation framework (VAF) in which an attack from X to
Y is successful only if the value promoted by X is ranked higher or equal than
the valued promoted by Y , in accordance to a given ordering on values. Figure 7
illustrates these various scenarios of preferentiality, given an attack set and the
resulting defeat (successful attack) set.
Starting attack set:
0.5

0.4

0.45

A

B

C

red

blue

blue

Preference of arguments: [B > A > C]

strength of arguments
arguments
values promoted
Rank of values: [red > blue]

Resulting successful attack set:
A

B

C

according to [28]:
Pollock’s defeasible reasoning

A

B

C

according to [30]:
preference-based relation (PAF)

A

B

C

according to [31]:
value-based argumentation (VAF)

Fig. 7. Implementations of preferentiality between arguments

The information necessary to decide whether an attack between two arguments is successful is often assumed to be pre-speciﬁed, and implemented as an
ordering of values or a given partial preference. However, according to [27], the
information related to preferentiality of arguments might be contradictory, as
the preferences may vary depending on the context and on diﬀerent subjects
who can assign diﬀerent strengths, to diﬀerent arguments, employing diﬀerent
criteria. This led the author to propose the concept of meta-level argument: a
simple node in a graph of nodes where preferentiality is abstractly deﬁned, by
creating a new attack relation that comes from a preference argument. Metalevel arguments allow no commitment regarding the deﬁnition of the preferences
of arguments, rendering the reasoning process simpler. To model the preference
relation among arguments, the notion of fuzziness has been used in [32] where
a fuzzy preference argumentation framework (FPAF) has been proposed. Here,
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A

B

A

B

Preference list: [A > B]

Preference argument C

(a) Standard preferentiality

(b) Meta-level argument

C

Fig. 8. Standard preferentiality and meta-level arguments

a value X attached to a preference relation between two arguments A, B corresponds to the degree of credibility by which A is strictly preferred to B. To
clarify the above notions, consider the example of Fig. 8 where two arguments
A, B, claiming two diﬀerent conclusions rebut each other. Suppose the existence
of a pre-deﬁned preference list in which argument A is preferred to argument
B (part a). According to Modgil [27], this situation can be expressed as in the
graph (part b) where another meta-level argument C is added to the reasoning
process, undercutting the inference link of argument B.
Strength of Attack Relations. Preferentiality, as reviewed so far, is implemented by assigning to arguments an importance value. This is usually predeﬁned, in form of a full or partial priority list of available arguments, or in form
of a numerical value attached to each of them, explicitly provided or implicitly
derived from the strength of the rules used within the argument. In turn preferentiality allows to establish whether an attack can be considered successful,
thus formalising a proper defeat relation, or considered a weak/false attack, thus
being disregarded. As opposite to this approach, another branch of argumentation is devoted to associate weights to attack relations instead to arguments.
In [26] the role of adding weights on the attack links between arguments has
been investigated, introducing the notion of inconsistency budget. This quantiﬁes the amount of inconsistency a designer of an argumentation system is willing
to tolerate. With an inconsistency budget α, the designer is open to disregard
attacks up to a total weight α. It turns out that, increasing this threshold, more
solutions can be achieved progressively as less attack would be disregarded. As a
consequence, this gives a preference order over solutions, and the solutions having a lower inconsistency budget are preferred. A similar recent approach that
considers the strength of attacks is incorporated in [33] resulting in a variedstrength attacks argumentation framework (VSAAF). Here, each attack relation
is assigned a type, and the framework is equipped with a partial ordering over
the types. Let us consider the example of Fig. 9 where the type of attack from
an argument A to B is i and from B to C is j. Intuitively, depending on whether
the type j is higher, lower or equally ranked than the type i, diﬀerent ranges of
solutions are possible. Beside this relation of attack, another approach has been
proposed [34] by employing the notion of fuzzy relations borrowed from Fuzzy
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A
VSAAF: 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n

i

B

j

FAF: i, j ∈ [0..1]
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C
PRAF: i, j ∈ [ n0 , n
]
n

Fig. 9. Types of the strength of attack relations

Logic [35,36]. This approach allows the representation of the degree to which an
argument attacks another one, creating a fuzzy argumentation framework (FAF).
Strength of arguments and defeat relations has been considered also in [37].
Here, probabilities are assigned both to arguments and defeats, introducing the
notion of probability argumentation framework (PRAF). Probabilities refer to
the likelihood of the existence of a speciﬁc argument or defeat relation, thus
capturing the inherent uncertainties in the argumentation system. The idea is
that all possible arguments neither deﬁnitely are disregarded nor they deﬁnitely
exist: they have diﬀerent chances of existing. In the approach proposed in [38]
two ﬁctitious people have to be confronted, endorsing respectively the roles of
proponent and opponent of the argument. Situation of conﬂicts are subsequently
analysed employing the paradigm of game theory [38].
3.6

Layer 4: Definition of the Dialectical Status of Arguments

Defeat relations, as per layer 3, focus on the relative strength of two individual arguments and do not tell yet what arguments can be seen as justiﬁable.
The ﬁnal state of each argument depends on the interaction with the others
and a deﬁnition of their dialectical status is needed. Layer 4 of the multi-layer
schema of Fig. 2 is aimed at determining the outcome of an argumentation system usually by splitting the set of arguments in two classes, those that support
a certain decision/action and those that do not. Sometimes a further class can
contain those arguments that leave the dispute in an undecided status. Multiple actions or decisions can be accounted for in a defeasible reasoning process,
thus the number of classes can increase. Modern implementations for computing
the dialectical status of arguments are usually built upon the theory of Dung
[9] which, historically speaking, derives from other more practical and concrete
works on argumentation such as [24,39]. Dung’s abstract argumentation frameworks (AF) allow comparisons of diﬀerent systems by translating them into his
abstract format [39]. The underlying idea is that given a set of abstract arguments (the internal structure is not considered) and a set of defeat relations,
a decision to determine which arguments can ultimately be accepted has to be
taken. AF is a directed graph in which arguments are presented as nodes and
the attacks as arrows (Fig. 10). Solely looking at an argument’s defeaters to
decide the status of an argument is not enough: it is also important to investigate whether the defeaters are defeated themselves. Generally, an argument B
defeats A if and only if B is a reason against A.
Given an AF, the issue is to decide which arguments should ultimately be
accepted. In Fig. 10, A is attacked by B, and apparently A should not be accepted
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Fig. 10. Argument and reinstatement

since it has a counterargument. However, B is itself attacked by C that, in turn,
is not attacked by anything, thus C should be accepted. But if C is accepted, then
B is ultimately rejected and does not form a reason against A anymore. Therefore
A should be accepted as well. In this scenario it is said that C reinstates A and in
order to determine which arguments of an AF can be accepted, a formal criterion
is necessary. This criterion is known as acceptability semantics, and given an AF,
it speciﬁes zero or more extensions (sets of acceptable arguments) [40]. Using
the labelling approach proposed in [41], each argument is either in, out or undec
according to two conditions:
1. an argument is labelled in if, only if all its defeaters are labelled out, and
2. an argument is labelled out if, only if it has at least one defeater labelled in.
Informally speaking, an argument labelled in means it has been accepted, out
means it has been rejected and undec means it can not be neither accepted nor
rejected. In the AF of Fig. 10, for argument C it holds that all its defeaters
are labelled out (trivial as C is not defeated by any argument), thus C has to
be labelled in. B now has a defeater labelled in thus it has to be labelled out.
For A, it holds that all its defeaters are labelled out, so it has to be labelled
in. As a consequence the resulting status of each argument is: Lab(A) = in,
Lab(C) = in and Lab(B) = out. Thus, A and C can be accepted and argument
B has to be rejected. A set of arguments is called conﬂict-free if and only if
it does not contain any argument A and B such that A defeats B. A set of
arguments Args is said to defend an argument C if and only if each defeater of
C is defeated by an argument in Args. These basic notions drive the proposal of
the complete semantics aimed at computing complete extensions [9]. The idea
is that a complete labelling might be viewed as a subjective and reasonable
point of view that a designer can consider with respect to which arguments are
accepted, rejected or considered undecided. Each point of view can be certainly
questioned by someone, but its internal inconsistency cannot be pointed out.
The set of complete labellings can be seen as the reasonable positions available
to a designer [41].
Complete semantics have an important property: more than one complete
extension might exist. However, sometimes it is advantageous to take a skeptical
approach, thus a semantics that is guaranteed to generate exactly one extension is the grounded semantics. The idea is to select the complete labelling Lab
in which the set of in-labelled arguments is minimal. The grounded extension
coincides with the complete labelling in which in is minimised, out is minimised
and undec is maximised and can be the empty set. In Fig. 10, the grounded
extension is {A, C}. However, this skeptical approach might be replaced by a
more credulous one, known as preferred semantics [9]. The idea is that, instead

Argumentation for KR, Conﬂict Resolution and Defeasible Inference

197

of maximising undec arguments, it maximises in arguments (and also out arguments). They are based on the notion of admissibility. A set of arguments is
admissible if and only if it is conﬂict-free and defends at least itself. The empty
set is admissible in every AF as it is conﬂict-free and trivially defends itself
against each of its defeaters (none). For any AF, there exists at least one preferred extension. Every grounded and every preferred extension is a complete
extension. In Fig. 10, the admissible sets are {C}, {A, C}. {B} and {A} are not
admissible as they do not defend themselves respectively against C and B. Only
one preferred extension exists: {A, C}. Grounded and preferred semantics have
been conceived by Dung and ﬁrstly described in his topical work [9]. However,
other semantics have been proposed such as the ideal semantics [42,43], semistable [44], stage [45], non-admissibility based semantics [46] and CF2 semantics
[47]. For further readings on argumentation semantics, the reader is referred to
[40,48].
3.7

Layer 5: Accrual of Acceptable Arguments

Multiple acceptable extensions of arguments may be computed from the previous
layer coinciding with possible consistent points of view that can be considered
for describing the knowledge being modelled and thus employed for decisionmaking and defeasible inference. However, sometimes for practical purposes,
as in the medical domain, a single decision must be takes or a single action
must be performed. Thus a ﬁfth layer is sometimes added to the argumentative
schema aimed at extracting the most credible or consistent point of view for
informing such a decision or action. It includes a strategy for computing, for
instance, a degree of credibility of each extension that can be used for purposes
of comparison. The most credible can be eventually selected and employed to
support decision-making. Various strategies have been proposed in the literature for selecting such an extension [49,50]. These include the consideration of
the strength of arguments, or a preference list among them deﬁned in layer 3.
Alternatively, the extension with higher cardinality can be considered, that is
the larger conﬂict-free set of arguments. In the literature of argumentation and
defeasible reasoning, this layer is probably the less developed and further works
should be carried out.

4

Application Areas

The previously described ﬁve layers (Fig. 2) give an overall idea of the main components that are usually considered in an argumentative process, and are strictly
connected. The ﬁrst layer deals with monological argumentation while the other
layers with dialogical argumentation. Some of these layers can be neglected or
merged together. For example, when the strength of arguments or attack relations is not considered, layer 3 can be discarded. Also, the strength of arguments
and their preferentiality may be considered in the 5th layer and not only in the
3rd layer. The literature of defeasible reasoning and its theoretical works is vast
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in the logic and artiﬁcial intelligence communities. Readers can refer to [16] for
a taxonomy of argument-based models and to [51] for a review of defeasible reasoning implementations. In this section, applications of defeasible reasoning and
argumentation in medicine and health-care are described. Argumentation was
adopted in the context of the Aspic project [52]: a general model for argumentation services. The goal was to develop a theoretical framework for inference,
decision-making, dialogue and learning that could be used, for example, in the
identiﬁcation of patients treatment options given multiple and conﬂicting pieces
of evidence. An application of this framework includes a multi-agent scenario
where three agents collaborate exchanging pros and cons of alternative interventions and diagnoses towards settling on a justiﬁable treatment for a patient
with chest pain [53]. Aspic has been also used as method for genetic counselling
aimed at providing patients and clinicians with an aid for customising, evaluating, visualising and communicating care plans. Another application concerned a
simulation where eight cancer genetic counsellors participated in an experiment
in which they had to counsel a woman carrying a risk-increasing gene mutation.
Information was visually displayed in an organised-fashion, in the form of structured arguments. These arguments helped counsellors enhancing their discussion
with the patient and explaining the options available for mitigating the risk of
cancer [54]. In the Aspic project, arguments are constructed from a knowledgebase of facts, internally modelled with strict and defeasible inference rules. These
rules are composed by a set of premises supporting a claim and an argument can
embed diﬀerent rules organised as a tree. Each argument has a numerical degree
of belief attached (1 for strict arguments and a partial degree, less than 1, for
defeasible arguments), and this can be computed employing diﬀerent principles.
These include the ‘weakest link’ principle in which the minimum of the strength
of an argument’s premises and its links is computed, or the ‘last link’ principle
in which the maximum strength of an argument’s links, with no accrual of reasons is considered [55]. Once arguments are deﬁned, the Aspic framework allows
the explication of a set of attack relations between them, always according to
the knowledge-base of facts. Dung’s calculus of opposition [9] is employed to
compute a dialectical (justiﬁcation) status of arguments. Eventually, from the
claim of the justiﬁed arguments, a ﬁnal inference is drawn, this being usually a
decision, a diagnosis or a treatment recommendation.
Argumentation has been used for medical group-decision support [56]. In this
context, expert clinicians participated in a group discussion to decide on the best
treatment for a given patient or case. A web-prototype to build arguments was
presented to a group of oncologists who were asked to discuss on treatment
therapies for patients having cancer in the head-to-neck region. Arguments were
modelled as natural language propositions constructed upon a particular piece
of evidence, acquired from the literature, and linked to a particular treatment
choice. Each argument was also accompanied by a value indicating the strength
of the underlying evidence. A machinery that extended Dung’s calculus of opposition [9] was proposed, followed by a preference-based accrual of arguments
[56]. Further research studies adopted the Aspic framework in the context of
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consensus on explanations and it focused on understanding how two clinicians,
with a disagreement in relation to an anomalous patient’s response to treatment,
exchanged arguments in order to arrive at a consensus [57]. Gorogiannis et al.
employed argumentation for investigating treatment eﬃcacy and their work was
motivated by the fact that, although there was a rapidly-growing dataset of
trial results, this dataset was inconsistent, incomplete and required a signiﬁcant
eﬀort to be sensibly aggregated for the inference of a single correct decision
[58]. The authors proposed an argument-based framework to analyse the available knowledge and present the diﬀerent possible results. In this framework,
the monological structure of arguments was modelled as a triple < A, B, C >
with A the set of evidence from a clinical trail, B an inference rule that linked
evidence to a claim C. The claim was a comparison between the outcomes of
two generic treatments t1 and t2 (only two-arm comparisons were treated) that
can be either t1 > t2 (t1 is statistically superior to t2), t2 < t1 (viceversa) or
t1 ∼ t2 (no statistical diﬀerence). Regarding the dialogical structure, arguments
(clinical tests) conﬂicted with each other if they entailed contradicting claims
and contradictions were resolved with the Dung’s calculus of opposition. This
framework was extended in [59] by allowing the expression of preferences among
arguments and by employing descriptive logic to further specify their monological structure. In this extension, authors performed a case study on ovarian
cancer data showing how the introduction of the dialogical Dung’s calculus of
opposition could support the selection of relevant/undisputed clinical evidence
in a large and fragmented dataset of cases.
Argumentation has been employed for predicting the recurrence of breast
cancer in patients who have undergone a surgery [60]. In this circumstance,
the knowledge-base of a cancer expert has been translated into arguments with
premises supporting either recurrence or non-recurrence of cancer. This monological structure has been subsequently extended adding conﬂicts among arguments organised dialogically, always according to the expert’s knowledge-base.
In turn, they were evaluated with the Dung’s calculus of opposition. A strategy
based on the largest cardinality was implemented for selecting the most credible
preferred extension, and thus recommending a justiﬁable outcome (recurrence
or non-recurrence). [61] describes an application of argumentation to the ﬁeld
of organ transplant called Carrel+. Human-organ is a decision-making process
that often illustrates conﬂicts among medical experts: what may be suﬃcient
for one doctor to discard an organ may not be for another one. This application
allows doctors to express their arguments about the viability of an organ and
employs monological argumentation techniques, namely argumentation schemes
[20] and critical questions [21] to combine arguments, to identify inconsistencies
and to propose a valid solution considering their relative strength as well as
the available evidence about the organ and the donor. Other ways to elaborate
and construct arguments exist and they diﬀer because of the variability of their
monological structure. For instance, [58,59] are diﬀerent from [61–63]. In the
former studies, arguments are built directly from clinical trial results with a uniform structure that makes the approach less domain-dependent and scalable to
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large-volume data. In the latter works, arguments are hand-crafted and ad-hoc
constructs built by relying on domain speciﬁc expertise and therefore they have
a variable internal structure.
Ultimately, [64] is probably the most complete work applying argumentation to medical decision support. This work is closely adhering to the 5-layer
schema previously introduced (Sect. 3). First, the available evidence, collected
from experts or literature, is converted into a monological argument structured
as an inference rule. Second, a medical expert can set up preference relations
by assigning a weight to each arguments (argument A can be preferred to B
because, despite having comparable eﬀects, A has fewer side eﬀects than B).
Third, meta-arguments can be built about the quality of arguments created in
the ﬁrst stage (an argument based on a non-randomised small sample is weaker
than another based on the evidence collected on a large randomised sample).
Forth, the dialogical structure is arranged in a Dung style argumentation graph
and an argumentation semantics is used for computing their dialectical and
acceptability status from which consistent conclusions can be suggested to the
decision makers. The study proposes several case studies: diagnosis of glaucoma,
treatment of hypertension and treatments of pre-eclampsia.
In summary, Table 2 gives a panoramic of the contributions reviewed so far,
classiﬁed according to the 5-layer schema introduced in Fig. 2 The aim is at
providing the reader with a high-level snapshot describing the current eﬀort
devoted towards producing argument-based systems in medicine and healthcare.
4.1

Features of Argumentation

Theoretically, argumentation and defeasible reasoning have a set of features that
are generally appealing and speciﬁcally interesting for clinicians and practitioners
in the ﬁeld of medicine and health-care [7,60].
– Inconsistency/incompleteness: argumentation provides a methodology for reasoning on available evidence, even if this evidence is partial and inconsistent
as it often happens in medicine and health-care;
– Expertise/uncertainty: argumentation captures expertise in an organised fashion, employing the notion of arguments and it can handle vagueness and the
uncertainty associated with clinical evidence;
– Intuitiveness: argumentation is close to the way humans reason. Vague knowledge bases can be structured as arguments built with familiar linguistic terms,
which is extremely appealing for clinicians;
– Explainability: argumentation leads to explanatory reasoning thanks to its
incremental, modular way of reasoning with available evidence. It provides
approaches for computing the justiﬁcation status of arguments, allowing the
ﬁnal decision of a reasoning process to be better explained;
– Dataset independency: argumentation does not require a complete dataset
and it may be useful for emerging knowledge, where quantitative evidence
has not yet been gathered or is limited;
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Table 2. Argument-based systems in medicine and health-care: applications
Ref

Layer 2

Layer 3

Layer 4

Layer 5

[52, 53] argumentation a tree of
services,
premises→claim +
patient
degree of belief
treatment
options

Domain

Layer 1

abstract
attacks

degree of
belief

dung

n/a

[54]

genetic
consueling,
care plans

Toulmin

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

[56]

groupdecision
support

natural language
propositions +
strength of evidence

abstract
attacks

preference
list

dung +

preferencebased

[57]

consensus,
explanations

a tree of
premises→claim +
degree of belief

abstract
attacks

degree of
belief

dung

n/a

[60]

cancer
prediction

premises→claim

abstract
attacks

n/a

dung

extension
cardinality

[58]

treatment
eﬃcacy

premises→claim

abstract
attacks

preference
list

dung

n/a

[59]

identiﬁcation
of relevant
evidence

descriptive logic

abstract
attacks

preference
relationships

dialectical
tree

n/a

[61]

organ
transplant
conﬁrmation

argument schemes
+ critical questions

abstract
attacks

argument
strength

dung

n/a

[62]

breast cancer
care

Evidence-based
guideline

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

[64]

Treatments of
diseases

inference rule

argument
strength

meta
arguments

dung

utility
theory

– Extensibility/updatability: argumentation is an extensible paradigm that
allows a decision to be retracted in the light of new evidence. An argumentation system can be updated with new arguments when they become available;
– Knowledge-bases comparability: argumentation allows comparisons of diﬀerent
subjective knowledge-bases. Two clinicians might build their own argumentation frameworks, identify diﬀerences in the deﬁnition of their beliefs, expertise
and intuitions as well as compare their inferential capacity;
– Consensus building: argumentation is a useful approach for decision-making
and achieving consensus between contradicting perspectives of knowledge.
Although argumentation has a great potential for supporting decisionmaking, enhancing knowledge representation and performing defeasible inference in the light of fragmented, partial, vague and inconsistent knowledge, it
has some limitations [10,11]. The aforementioned features are appealing at the
theoretical level, however, there are more practical, open problems for applied
research. The following section is aimed at describing these problems and present
future challenges for enabling wide-spread application of argumentation at the
more practical level. Readers can refer to [11] for a further discussion on the role
of argumentation and argumentation-based applications in modern computing.
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Open Problems and Challenges

Bench-Capon and Dunne discussed limitations of argumentation in artiﬁcial
intelligence and computer science [10], identifying a set of challenges concerning
the widespread deployment of argumentation technology. These challenges are
still valid and their resolution requires the union of theoretical work with more
practical engineering work. Probably, the most important limitation concerns
the adoption of argumentation methods and systems in practical ﬁelds, these
including medicine and health care. However, other limitations exist:
– lack of engineering solutions for application/automation of argumentation
– lack of a strong link between argumentation and other formalisms for dealing
with uncertainty;
– scalability of argument-based applications and their widespread;
– ambiguity of the communication protocols and language that can be used by
artiﬁcial agents incorporating argumentative capabilities.
Firstly, as it often happens in real-world knowledge-engineering, pieces of
knowledge are abundant, so the amount of arguments that can be built upon
them. However, engineering and software tools for the monological representation of arguments are limited, despite advances in technology and interfaces.
Diagrammatic representations of arguments have been proposed [20,21,65] but
their implementation in practice is still narrow. Human reasoning over graphical
diagrams is fundamental to enable human experts to translate their knowledge
bases and beliefs in a computable form employable for reasoning and inference.
User-friendly interfaces are necessary for enabling human operators to link arguments together, for modelling their conﬂicts and for performing inference through
the execution of acceptability semantics for the resolution of these conﬂicts.
These bottlenecks must be addressed to support the deployment and adoption of
argument-based applications. Advances in user-interface design and deployment
as well as the availability of web-based tools (javascript) are valid candidates for
tackling these bottlenecks.
Secondly, in order to facilitate the impact of argument-based applications in
the arena of intelligent computer systems, a further challenge is the construction
of a stronger link with other formalisms for dealing with uncertainty within the
broader ﬁeld of artiﬁcial intelligence. Examples include probability and Bayesian
theories, Dempster-Shafer theory and Game Theory [38] for applications requiring the interaction of multiple parties, participants [56] or Fuzzy Sets and Logic
[32,34–36] for representation of vague knowledge. Further formalisms concerning the supporting of collaborative work/learning or decision-making [52] include
Organisational Theory [66,67] and Decision theory [68].
Thirdly, another important challenge refers to the scalability of applications
of argumentation and their widespread. This means that in order to demonstrate
the impact of argument-based technologies to knowledge representation and reasoning, several applications have to be deployed and tested in diﬀerent disciplines
such as education, medicine [54,56,57,64], psychology, biology extending traditional ﬁelds of application such as artiﬁcial intelligence [10], computer science,
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philosophy, linguistic and human-computer Interaction [69–71]. The scalability
challenge also refers to a more technical issue concerning the deployment of engineering systems that can easily scale, such as in [72], and let a great amount
of parties, participants or artiﬁcial agents to be engaged in a large-scale argumentative process and enabling collective intelligence [73]. Assuming the above
challenges can be resolved there is another important challenge referred to the
development of the protocols for allowing artiﬁcial agents, incorporating argumentative capabilities, to communicate, argue and negotiate with each other in
a distributed digital world [11,74]. Recent advances in the ﬁeld of multi-agent
systems might oﬀer valid approaches to tackle this problem.

6

Future Outlook

This chapter has presented an overview of argumentation for knowledge representation, conﬂict resolution and defeasible reasoning, with an informal description
of the multi-layer pattern usually adopted for implementing in practice such reasoning. A literature review of applications of argumentation showed how defeasible reasoning has been employed so far in the medical and health-care sectors.
Advantages and features of argumentation have been proposed emphasising the
beneﬁts for defeasible inference under uncertainty. Open problems and challenges
have been identiﬁed, these mainly referring to the practical applicability of argumentation rather than the development of new theoretical formalisms. The lack
of user-friendly tools and procedures employable by humans to build arguments,
connect them in a dialogical structure and enable defeasible reasoning in practice
is the most important challenge for applied research. From a more theoretical
perspective, future work should be focused on the integration of argumentation
theory and machine learning as two diﬀerent but complementary methods for
enhancing knowledge representation and extraction, reasoning and classiﬁcation
with fragmented, partial and conﬂicting information [75]. This integration could
be tackled through 3 points of interaction (Fig. 11, A, B, C).
deductive
elicitation & inconsistency resolution

knowledge base
arguments
structure
A
argument
mining

arguments
conﬂicts

conﬂicts
evaluation

dialectical
status

inference
arguments
accrual

B
C
rules/patterns
+ quantities

unsupervised

supervised

data

Machine learning
inductive

Fig. 11. Integration of machine learning and defeasible argumentation

On one hand, argumentation represents a theory and belief-driven deductive paradigm to reasoning over pieces of evidence, potentially conﬂicting and
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fragmented towards a ﬁnal inference. On the other hand, machine learning, is
a data-driven inductive paradigm aimed at exploring data, extracting patterns
and building learning models from it so classiﬁcation can be performed and predictions can be made. Through these models, new arguments can be built and
incorporated in existing knowledge-bases thus enhancing reasoning processes (A)
[76]. The rules and patterns emerged from unsupervised machine learning techniques and the predictions, probabilistic values available in supervised machine
learning classiﬁers can support the resolution of potential inconsistencies in a
defeasible reasoning process, providing it with numerical attributes useful for formalising preferences and deciding between conﬂicting arguments (B). Eventually,
the inference produced by a defeasible reasoning process can provide machine
learning with a useful theoretical background for identifying deceptive chains
of inference that might lead to erroneous results (C). Hybrid models employing
both the paradigms can beneﬁt from the advantages of each approach and tackle
their pitfalls and they are expected to perform better in term of representation,
clustering of knowledge and in term of prediction and inference.
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